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Abstract
This paper discusses the comparative productivity performance of Eastern and Western
Europe since 1950. Firstly, it looks at the productivity estimates since the beginning of
transition in 1989. Despite a decline in output, the turmoil of the late 1980s affected labour
participation more strongly, so that labour productivity growth has been less affected than per
capita income growth. Presently, there are signs of a renewed slowdown in productivity
growth in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC’s), even though there is much
diversity between the countries.
Secondly an historical approach is adopted by taking into account the growth
performance of CEEC’s for the period 1950-1989. The estimates suggest a long-term trend
towards productivity slowdown in Eastern Europe beyond the slowdown in Western Europe
since 1973. Indeed the growth path in the CEEC’s before transition can be characterised as
“extensive growth”. Growth was based on rapid accumulation of resources without successful
application of new technologies, which led to declining efficiency in the use of resources. It is
argued that the present difficulties in closing the productivity and income gap between East
and West are still partly due to the legacy of the past. Policies to improve work organisation,
change production strategies, and strengthen quality of training are typically effective in the
long run and will not materialise in immediate sustained gains in productivity.
Thirdly the paper takes a look at the convergence and divergence trends in productivity
since 1950. It outlines a continuous process of productivity divergence between Eastern and
Western Europe, despite convergence within each of the two regions. It is argued that the
brief episode of convergence since 1992 is primarily the result of the recovery of shock effects
of the transition. A long term process of productivity convergence depends on the success by
which the past process of extensive growth can be transformed into intensive growth, i.e.,
growth based on efficient resource use and successful adaptation of new technologies. This
requires institution building to strengthen the effectiveness of product, labour and capital
markets in the long run.4
1. Introduction
The rapid changes in the political, economic and social constellation in Central and Eastern
Europe a decade ago, have had a large impact on economic performance relative to Western
Europe and the rest of the industrialised world. Following the turmoil of the late 1980s, real
GDP levels in the region fell by 20% on average between 1989 and 1992. Since 1993/1994
most Central and East European countries (CEEC’s) have seen a recovery of growth.
However, there has been substantial diversity across countries. Some countries (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) are now more or less back to the 1989 output
level, and Poland has even surpassed it. Other countries (including the Baltic States, Bulgaria
and Romania) also show recovery, but at a much slower pace. In contrast, most economies of
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and those of the war-struck Balkan nations
continue to shrink year after year. Some CEEC’s (Czech Republic and Slovenia) are now at
per capita income levels between 60 and 70 per cent of the EU-average, but others (Bulgaria
and Romania) are only at 20 to 30 per cent of the EU per capita income level.
This paper brings out three major points:
1)  To assess the comparative growth performance of CEEC’s, other indicators besides output
and per capita income are needed. In particular measures of growth rates and levels of
productivity measures help in evaluating the efficiency with which resources are used.
2)  Evaluation of the productivity performance of Eastern Europe requires a long-term
perspective. This should include an assessment of the legacy of the past concerning the
process of capital formation and resource allocation. It requires a reconciliation of
measures obtained from “statistical” studies on the one hand and “matched plant” studies
or other microeconomic evidence on the other.
3)  To achieve long run productivity convergence between Eastern and West Europe a long term
commitment to efficient resource use and successful adaptation of new technologies, based
on institution building that strengthens the effectiveness of product, labour and capital
markets, is needed.
The paper begins by outlining trends in output, employment and labour productivity in
Eastern Europe relative to the European Union, the Russian Federation and the USA over the
past decade. With the use of labour market indicators, Section 2 also reconciles per capita income
and labour productivity levels for three East European countries, i.e. the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, relative to the European Union for 1996. Section 2 also briefly deals with
the question how productivity in the eastern provinces of Germany (formerly East Germany),
which became fully integrated in the European Union immediately after the collapse of
communism, has developed relative to the most advanced East European countries.
Section 3 adopts a historical perspective by reviewing the evidence on real output and
productivity growth in Eastern Europe relative to the European Union over the past half
century. It briefly discusses the major problems involved in comparing growth rates between5
centrally planned economies (CPE’s) and western economies. There is still a great deal of
uncertainty about the growth performance of the East European economies during this period.
However, a pattern of long-term productivity slowdown beyond that of the slowdown in the
European Union has clearly emerged. This slowdown is ascribed to the “extensive growth”
path in Eastern Europe, based on excessive use of inputs and increasingly slow output growth.
 Section 4 focuses on the productivity performance of the industrial sector, which is of
crucial importance in the process of technology creation and productivity growth. New
estimates are provided from a series of benchmark comparisons of manufacturing productivity
carried out within the framework of the ICOP project at the University of Groningen. A
confrontation is made of these “statistical results” with those derived from “matched plant”
studies carried out for the Czech Republic, East Germany and Hungary by Hitchens and
associates (1993, 1996). This sheds further light on the causes of the long-term productivity
slowdown and the major bottlenecks to move onto an “intensive growth” path, i.e. growth that
is primarily productivity-led.
Section 5 discusses the convergence issue in more detail. It establishes a pattern of
productivity divergence between Eastern Europe and the EU since the 1950s, which has
continued until the early 1990s.
Finally, Section 6 discusses the challenges ahead for East European countries to
improve productivity performance. The main point is that the legacy of the past has not been
wiped out overnight and that policies should have a long run focus aimed at generating a
sustained improvement in economic performance.
2. The Shock Effects on Per Capita Income and Productivity Growth during Transition
Per Capita Income versus Productivity Trends
The collapse of the communist regimes, and with it the termination of central economic
planning, had an immediate and very negative effect on the economic performance of the
countries involved. Graphs 1a and 1b compare trends in GDP per capita and labour
productivity. The graphs show that the collapse in per capita income between 1989 and 1992
in Central and Eastern Europe the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been
bigger than that of labour productivity.
1 Graph 1c shows why. Between 1989 and 1992
employment/population ratios in Eastern Europe and the CIS declined dramatically.
2 Since
1992 the recovery in per capita income has been somewhat slower than for labour
                                           
1 Unless otherwise mentioned “Central and Eastern Europe” in this paper includes Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
2 All labour input estimates in this paper are based on numbers of persons employed. Reliable and internationally
consistent estimates of working hours of employed persons are scarce, even for advanced western economies
(see, for example, OECD, 1998). The lack of working hours for East European countries and CIS probably
implies an overstatement of the collapse in labour productivity, because during the period 1989-1992 many firms
engaged in short-time working of employees who were kept on the payroll.6
productivity as average employment/population ratios continued to decline. Labour
productivity in Eastern Europe grew at almost 6 per cent per year on average between 1992
and 1996 compared to 4.9 per cent growth in per capita income. For Eastern Europe,
employment/population rates are now at similarly low levels as in the European Union, i.e. at
about 40 per cent. In the CIS countries, employment/population rates are still relatively high,
but lower than in the United States where it is about 50 per cent.
The greater decline and slower recovery of per capita income relative to productivity
can be explained by the rapid shake-out of unproductive activities. This caused a rapid rise in
unemployment, but helped productivity to recover.
3 Hence the burden of transition was
primarily placed on living standards. It should be noted, however, that both Graphs 1a and 1b
signal a slowdown in per capita income and productivity growth since 1996, which may be a
cause of concern for the near future.
4
A more disaggregated view on each of the seven East European countries in our
sample reconfirms the diversity mentioned in the introduction. Even though the direction of
the trends was more or less the same in all countries, the phasing of the shake-out process
described above was different (Graphs 2a to 2g). For example, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia
experienced a rapid decline in labour intensity and relatively rapid recovery of labour
productivity. In contrast productivity in the Czech Republic employment/population ratios
hardly declined, but at the same time productivity did not increase much since 1992. This
atypical development of the Czech economy may be due to the fact that the large privatization
programme speeded up structural reallocations (as is confirmed by measures reported by
Blanchard (1997)) but did not necessarily lead to the much-needed restructuring of firms
within sectors and industries (Havlik, 1999).
Slovakia experienced a larger drop in the employment/population ratio than the Czech
Republic, but compared to Bulgaria and Romania, Slovak productivity recovered beyond the
1989 level. Romania is a clear case of limited restructuring during the first part of the
transition period. Whereas the share of employment in the population remained virtually
constant, productivity and per capita income collapsed by more than 30 per cent. Even though
Romania experienced some recovery between 1992 and 1996, the past two years have led to a
further deterioation of the situation.
                                           
3 Blanchard (1997) observes similar U-shaped responses of output and productivity in CEEC’s since the
beginning of transition
4 Part of the collapse in per capita income in Eastern Europe may be overstated because of a rise in non-market
production and non-registered economic activity. In this respect the labour productivity figures may be more
exact even though they do not cover all economic activity: both the numerator (GDP) and the denominator
(employment) of the equation relate to registered economic activities only.7
Sources: GGDC Total Economy Data Base (see Appendix I)
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Comparative Levels of Labour Productivity
Apart from looking at growth rates, estimates of relative levels of economic performance
provide additional information on the potential of East-European countries for catch-up with
the world’s economic leaders. Estimates of levels are troubled by the fact that, apart from
reliable figures on GDP and employment, purchasing power parities (PPPs) are required to
correct for relative price differences across countries. PPP estimates for East European
countries involved serious complications in the past, but even today there are reasonably good
and comparable estimates of PPPs for only a limited number of countries. Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic are now full OECD members, and therefore participate in the regular
updating of PPPs within the multilateral ICP programme of Eurostat and OECD. Nevertheless
most East European countries also participated in the European Comparisons Programme
which developed PPPs on a bilateral basis relative to Austria for 1996 (Havlik, 1999).
Table 1 shows the average level of labour productivity in Eastern Europe and the
Russian Federation relative to the European Union. Between 1989 and 1992, East European
labour productivity relative to the EU fell by more than 4%-points. Since then the average
relative level has recovered and almost reached the 1989 level in 1997. The last two columns
of Table 1 show the hypothetical catch-up period ahead. If Eastern Europe is able to generate
a growth advantage over the EU growth rate of 2 or 3 per cent per year it would still take
about 30 up to 50 years to catch up with the latter’s average per capita income level.
Table 1 also shows that the collapse in the Russian Federation was much more serious
than in Eastern Europe, and that the productivity gap relative to the European Union has
continued to increase over the past few years. Even if the economy of the Russian Federation
would get onto a recovery track creating a 3% growth advantage over the European Union, it
would still take almost 50 years to reach the average EU productivity level. In the remainder
of this paper we will concentrate on the countries that are potential entrants to the EU.
Table 1
GDP per Person Employed (levels relative to EU) and number of years required
to reach full convergence on the basis of given 2% or 3% growth surplus
GDP per Person Employed Number of Years for
European Union = 100 (c) Convergence to EU level
1989 1992 1998 2%-growth 3%-growth
surplus in surplus in
lab. prod’ty lab. prod’ty
Eastern Europe (a) 40.0 35.0 39.9 46 30
Russian Federation 52.5 41.2 29.4 60 40
European Union (b) 100.0 100.0 100.0 --- ---
United States 122.1 119.7 120.8 --- ---
(a)  Includes Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia.
(b) Excludes Luxembourg
(c)  Estimates are PPP-based
Source: GGDC Total Economy Data Base (see Appendix I)10
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Graphs 3a to 3c show a reconciliation of comparative levels of labour productivity
(represented by the bar most to the left) and per capita income (represented by the bar most to
the right) for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary relative to the EU average. The
numbers in between the bars in each diagram represent the percentage contribution to the
difference between the relative productivity and the relative per capita income level. These
differences are due to unemployment, labour force participation and demographic structure.
Graph 3a shows that low unemployment and high labour force participation in the
Czech Republic relative to the European Union provides the Czechs with a relatively high per
capita income level compared to their relative labour productivity level vis-à-vis the EU. In
contrast, Hungary’s substantially lower labour force participation relative to the EU average,
makes it show up better in terms of productivity than in terms of per capita income (Graph
3b). Hence the much better labour market performance of the Czech Republic is reflected in a
18%-percentage lead of the Czech Republic over Hungary in terms of per capita income.
However, given recent observations that up till recently the Czech economy has undergone
less restructuring than the Hungarian economy, it is not certain whether the Czech per capita
income advantage over Hungary can be maintened in the long run. (Havlik, 1999)
5
Productivity and per capita income levels in Poland are substantially lower than in either the
Czech Republic or Hungary (Graph 3c).
6
The Performance of East German Provinces Relative to Eastern Europe
A specific case of interest is the performance of the economy of the East German provinces
relative to the most advanced East European countries. In contrast to the other former
communist countries, East Germany was fully exposed to the joys and burdens of political and
economic integration with the EU, and West Germany in particular, right after the collapse of
communism.
Graph 4b shows that during 1989-1991, East Germany experienced lower productivity
levels than Hungary and, in particular, the Czech Republic. But since 1991 East German
labour productivity has moved ahead of that of the other East European countries. Graph 4c
shows the mirror-side of the acceleration of East German productivity, i.e. a rapid decline in
employment/population rates to levels well below those of the Czech Republic, and close to
those of Hungary and Poland. East German participation rates have historically been high, and
to some extent the decline in labour force participation may be ascribed to an adjustment to
more common levels. This observation is reinforced by the fact that the fall in employment
during 1989-1991 did not lead to a large drop in productivity, and that since 1992 East
                                           
5 Indeed the most recent OECD figures show a smaller per capita income gap between Hungary and the Czech
Republic. In 1998 GDP per capita in Hungary (at 1996 PPPs) is estimated 10,129 US$ relative to 12,517 US$ in
the Czech Republic, which is a gap of 19 percentage points compared to 28 percentage points in 1996. Hungarian
labour productivity was almost 2 percent ahead of the Czech level in 1998.
6 Because of limited quality of the data this analysis was not carried out for the other East European countries.
For estimates of productivity levels of other East European countries relative to the EU, see Appendix I.12
Germany’s participation rate has slowly improved.
7 Moreover, Graph 4a shows that East
Germany experienced the most rapid improvement in GDP per head of the population.
Compared to the other East European countries, East Germany’s transition was one of
very rapid structural change as out-of-date capital and obsolete technologies were quickly
disposed off. The rapid rise in wage and price levels due to the 1:1 conversion of the Ost-
Mark to the D-Mark seriously affected competition. These burdens of reunification were to a
large extent cushioned by the huge transfers from West- to East Germany of social payments
and investment in construction and other capital-intensive projects. Compared to the other
East European countries, and the Czech Republic in particular, the East German provinces
seem to have benefited from integration in terms of productivity and per capita income gains,
following the initial serious losses.
However, in 1997 and 1998 growth in East Germany has leveled off. This is partly
related to the overall persistent slowdown of the German economy, but growth of real output
in East Germany was also slower than in West Germany for the first time since reunification.
The nearing end of the construction boom in East Germany and the slowdown of transfers
from West Germany, which served as an impetus to demand, are important factors explaining
the slowdown. Hence the long term benefits of rapid integration are not yet confirmed by the
East German experience.
Conclusion
The conclusion from the analysis so far is that during the transition years per capita income
was much more strongly hit than labour productivity. In particular during 1989-1992 the
slowdown in productivity growth was less than that of per capita income. This is because the
shock effects from the transition primarily affected labour input. Under the new economic
regime, inefficient firms exited or laid off labour to a large extent. The remaining firms which
managed to restructure or newly entering firms benefited from new investment and new
market opportunities. The latter effect began to dominate the growth trend since 1992. Hence
productivity restored more quickly than per capita income since then.
However, the diversity in the recovery among the East European countries is big. For
example, except for Slovenia, the Czech Republic started off with the highest productivity
levels in the region at the beginning of the period of transition, but was subsequently
overtaken by East Germany and more recently by Hungary. The Czech per capita income
level remained more stable as labour force participation rates did not fall much. On the other
hand, there are indications that the Czech Republic has been less successful than Poland and
Hungary in restructuring economic activity and in absorbing foreign direct investment.
                                           
7 In contrast to the other East European countries, reasonably reliable estimates of working hours exist for East
Germany since 1989. These suggest a drop in hours per person between 1989 and 1991, but since then the trend
moved back to the 1989 level and remained relatively stable since then. Hence the decline in East German
productivity between 1989 and 1991 may be somewhat overstated, but the upward trend since 1991 is not much
affected by changes in working hours per person (see Lindlar, 1998)13
Sources: GGDC Total Economy Data Base (see Appendix I)
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There is also a group of CEEC’s, notably Bulgaria and Romania, which are still not
even back at their 1989 levels of productivity and face a trend in per capita income which is
still negative. But even for the more successful reformers, the long run prospects for sustained
productivity growth remain uncertain. Despite an acceleration of productivity growth since
1992 there are signs of somewhat slower growth in the region since 1996. Part of the
slowdown may be due to an exhaustion of the “reconstruction effect” as observed by Jánossy
(1971) in relation to the rapid growth episode in Europe during the first two decades following
the World War II. Most clearly, the recent slowdown of output growth in East Germany
suggests no evidence of the advantages of rapid and full integration for the long run.
3. The Long Term Productivity Slowdown
It is important to distinguish between productivity growth in the long run and the short run. In
the short term, labour productivity measures can be strongly affected by the business cycle
and by shifts in industry structure due to changing competitive pressures. As the previous
section showed, such short term effects impacted the slowdown in productivity in Eastern
Europe immediately after the collapse of central planning economies and the subsequent
recovery thereafter. Indeed, Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1989) emphasise that policies
which focus on accumulation and technological change and therefore support productivity
growth, matter less for combating such important but transitory problems as reducing
inflation, unemployment and balance of payments deficits.
In the long term, productivity growth contributes to a rise in real wages, high
participation rates and increased living standards. This being also the ultimate aim of intensified
economic cooperation among European states, a focus on the longer term is needed. Indeed it is
unlikely that, despite the past decade’s fundamental changes in Eastern Europe’s economic
and political regimes, the impact on efficiency of the structural and institutional conditions
under central planning during the four decades before, were fully wiped out with the
revolutions of the late 1980s. This section therefore goes back into history to establish the
legacy of output and productivity performance in Eastern Europe during the period 1950-1989.
Comparisons of Productivity Growth Rates Using the Adjusted Factor Cost Method
There are many problems in adequately measuring the growth of real output and productivity in
Eastern Europe during the period of central planning. Official growth rates have been highly
overstated. A study of the literature suggests that the following factors are the most important:
8
                                           
8 See, for example, Bergson (1991), Maddison (1995, 1998), Marer (1985, 1991) and Schroeder (1995).15
1)  The estimates of real output growth in centrally planned economies (CPE’s) were directly
based on an aggregation of enterprise accounts. According to these accounts, output was
priced in both current and “comparable” prices.
9 Managers often inflated their output because
they claimed relatively high prices for “new” products. This was motivated by suggesting
higher production costs for these new products or by claiming substantial quality
improvements which in reality were often minor compared to existing products. Prices of
existing products were insufficiently adjusted downwards once cost reductions had occurred
or when the quality began to deteriorate. When net material product in current prices was
deflated by the official "constant price" deflator, insufficient account was taken of the actual
pricing practices of firms.
2)  The estimated growth rates of gross output in CPE’s were upwardly biased by the rising
share of production for intermediate use. The planning system often required intensive
cooperation among firms supplying each other with intermediate inputs. Frequently firms
were also forced to subcontract to fulfil production targets.
3)  The accounts of the former CPE’s were based on the Material Product System (MPS),
which only reported the output of physical production and material services. In practice
the coverage of the MPS gradually expanded over time. For example, in Czechoslovakia
the concept of production since the early 1950s developed from the value of "production
of goods delivered" to the value of "productive work and services", and finally also to the
value of "production produced and consumed" by the enterprise.
4)  Finally, at different stages in the process there was deliberate overreporting of output.
Managers may have overreported their gross output in order to achieve their planned targets.
There may also have been some overreporting at the national level to put the country
performance in a favourable light internationally.
The reconstruction of the growth performance of former CPE’s could in principle be
carried out along two different routes. The first approach aimed at reestimating the current value
aggregates or price indexes to eliminate the effects of hidden inflation and make a correction for
the effect of the introduction of the so-called "new" products. However, reconstructing the price
series appeared a difficult path to pursue for long term studies mainly because of the lack of
appropriate price statistics.
The second more widely used approach was based on the "adjusted factor cost" (AFC)
method. This method, which originates from the work of Abram Bergson on the reconstruction
of  Soviet growth performance, was used by the CIA to monitor Soviet economic performance.
10
The AFC-method made use of physical output measures which were weighted at adjusted factor
                                           
9 It is important to distinguish "comparable" prices from "constant" prices, as the former does not necessarily mean
that prices refer to one and the same base year. This was in particular so when new products were introduced for
which no price was available at the time of the base year.
10 See, for example, Bergson (1961, 1991) and Joint Economic Committee (1982, 1990).16
cost weights. The factor cost weights approximately represented the compensation for labour (i.e.
the sum of wages and salaries and social security contributions) and capital (i.e. depreciation
allowances and an estimate of the return on capital). This approach had advantages over the
"repricing" method, because the basic data, in particular the quantity information, was more
readily available than the prices.
The reliability of the AFC estimates has been widely discussed in the literature on Soviet
growth. Some scholars argued that the alternative estimates understated real output growth.
11 The
main argument was that the adjusted factor cost method relies too heavily on the output in terms
of physical quantities, and took insufficiently account of the introduction of new products in
particular in the area of machinery and electrical equipment. In contrast, other scholars argued
that, despite the substantial downward adjustment relative to the official estimates, the AFC
growth rates were still upwardly biased, because of the increased deterioration in product quality,
the decline in technology performance and the higher raw material content of products
originating from CPE’s compared to market economies.
12 In a recent review, Maddison (1998)
has argued that “the CIA estimates of Soviet growth performance … are the best documented
and most reasonable estimates we have” (p. 322).
For East European countries the AFC method, or a particular variant of it, was applied in
a range of studies by a team of researchers headed by Thad Alton.
13 Alton’s “Research Project
on National Income in East Central Europe” produced about hundred and twenty research
reports over a period of about 25 years. It provided separate estimates by industry of origin and
by expenditure category. The estimates were carefully documented, in particular in the earliest
reports covering the period 1937 to 1967. For this period the factor cost weights were usually
benchmarked in the mid-1950’s, but subsequently weights were shifted to later benchmark years.
Maddison (1995) and van Ark (1996) have extensively used the estimates from the
“Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe” for the reconstruction of the
growth of total GDP and manufacturing output in Eastern Europe respectively. Table 2 provides
the growth rates of labour productivity for the total economy for the sub-periods 1950-1973 and
1973-1989. These AFC-based growth rates are substantially lower than the official estimates. For
example, van Ark (1996) shows that with output derived on the basis of the net material product
concept, growth of labour productivity in industry was 1.5 percentage higher in Czechoslovakia
and 2 percentage points higher in East Germany for the whole period 1950-1989.
14
Table 2 shows that in all countries a strong slowdown in productivity growth set in
during the period 1973-1989 relative to 1950-1973. To some extent the productivity
slowdown was also experienced by the western countries, mainly due to oil crises of the
                                           
11 See, for example, Boretzky (1987).
12 See, for example, Aslund (1990).
13 For a discussion of the estimates for Eastern Europe by Alton and associates, see Marer (1985) and Maddison
(1995). Van Ark (1996) deals in detail with “Alton estimates” for manufacturing.
14 See van Ark (1996), Table 7.6.17
1970’s. Indeed productivity growth in the European Union was 2.2 percentage points slower
during the period 1973-1989 than during the period 1950-1973. But for most East European
countries the slowdown was bigger than in the West. Only Czechoslovakia and Hungary
experienced a more moderate slowdown compared to the EU average.
Table 2
Annual Compound Growth Rates of Real Output per Person Employed for Total Economy
according to Adjusted Factor Cost Estimates
Bulgaria Czecho- East Hungary Poland Romania European
slovakia Germany Union (e)
Total Economy
(1) 1950-73 5.7 2.9 3.7 3.3 3.4 5.8 4.2
(2) 1973-89 1.3 1.1 0.8 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.9
(3) 1989-98 -0.7 0.3 (a) 5.2 2.2 3.5 -0.8 1.7
2.3 (b)
growth differential (%-points)
(4) (2)-(1) -4.4 -1.8 -2.9 -2.1 -2.5 -4.6 -2.2
(5) (3)-(2) -2.0 -0.8 (c) 4.4 1.0 2.6 -2.0 -0.2
1.2 (d)
(a)  Czech Republic
(b)  Slovakia
(c)  Slowdown of Czech Republic relative to Czechoslovakia
(d)  Slowdown of Slovakia relative to Czechoslovakia
(e)  Present EU membership, excluding Luxembourg
Source: GGDC Total Economy Data Base. See Appendices I and II.
For the period 1989-1998 the diversity in East European productivity performance,
alluded to before, is reflected once more in Table 2. In East Germany, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia productivity growth accelerated compared to the period 1973-1989, but it continued to
slow even more compared to the earlier period in the Czech Republic and in particular in
Bulgaria and Romania.
Comparisons of Productivity Levels
Backward extrapolation of levels of labour productivity relative to Western economies using the
growth indices described above is troublesome for two reasons. Firstly, the real growth estimates
use fixed weights for relatively long periods, so that the index increasingly deviates from the
“real” growth the further one moves away from the benchmark year.
15 Secondly, there have been
substantial statistical breaks in the output series around 1989-1990. In particular the change from
MPS to SNA systems of national accounting has led to a different classification of industries and
another method of estimating output.
16
                                           
15 Until recently the use of fixed weights was also practised in the US National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA), but most West European countries have been using shifting for 5- or 10-year periods. Most recently, the
US NIPA has begun to use annual weights to construct constant price series.
16 An alternative approach to comparisons of per capita income is the physical indicator (PIM) method. In short it
uses statistical relationships between selected physical indicators and per capita GDP in market economies to
obtain measures of income per head for countries which lack reliable national accounts (see, for example,18
Table 3
Relative Levels of Output per Person Employed for Total Economy (European Union = 100)
Bulgaria Czecho- East Hungary Poland Romania European
Slovakia Germany Union (a)
1950 25 76 67 68 45 30 100
1960 33 75 75 66 43 36 100
1973 35 57 60 57 38 43 100
1979 37 55 60 56 36 47 100
1989 32 50 50 52 32 37 100
1998 26 52 (b) 69 55 38 30 100
51 (c)
(a)  Present EU membership, excluding Luxembourg.
(b)  Czech Republic
(c)  Slovakia
Source: GGDC Total Economy Data Base. Backward extrapolation from 1996 US$ GDP per person employed. For
time series see Appendices I and II.
Table 3 shows the comparative levels of labour productivity relative to the European
Union-average for a number of years on the basis of backward extrapolation from the post-
transition PPP-adjusted estimates presented in Section 2. The table shows the large productivity
gap which has arisen between all East European countries and the EU since 1950. It also shows
that Czechoslovakia clearly started off as the most productive country among the six countries in
the region. Over time productivity levels converged between Czechoslovakia, East Germany and
Hungary. Bulgaria, Poland and Romania clearly remained among the poorer countries in the
region. As shown before East German productivity levels rapidly moved ahead of those of the
other countries since 1989. These estimates are analysed in some more detail in the framework of
the discussion on convergence in Section 5.
Causes of the Slowdown under Central Planning from a Macro Perspective
The causes for the slowdown in productivity growth have been extensively discussed in a
wide range of studies using qualitative as well as quantitative evidence.
17 As mentioned
above, some of the causes are not specific to the centrally planned economies, as the advanced
market economies experienced a growth slowdown since the mid-1970’s as well. But clearly
in the case of the CPEs there have been additional factors explaining the slowdown, including
structural distortions causing large inefficiencies on the supply side, and institutional factors
which limited the mobility of resources to more efficient uses.
However, it has appeared difficult to systematically assess the sources of growth and
stagnation for East European countries by combining the qualitative and quantitative evidence
                                                                                                                                        
Ehrlich, 1991, and UN/ECE, 1993). This approach is less suitable for comparisons of productivity than for
comparisons of per capita income. See Marer (1985) for a detailed critique of PPPs and the PIM method.
17 For extensive reviews, see Aldcroft and Morewood (1995) and Berend (1996). The volumes on East European
countries in the Routledge series on  “Contemporary Economic History of Europe”, including Poland (Landau
and Tomaszewski, 1985), Hungary (Berend and Ránki, 1985), Bulgaria (Lampe, 1986) and Czechoslovakia
(Teichova, 1988) are also recommended.19
in a comprehensive growth accounting framework.
18 This is mainly due to the sensitivity of
growth accounting estimates for both the method and the data used. Concerning data, reliable
estimates of the capital stock for centrally planned economies are mostly lacking. Another
substantial problem is that changes in intensity of labour cannot be properly measured without
estimates of man-hours.
Concerning the methodology of the growth accounts, there has been much controversy
about the nature of the production function which would best fit the performance of these
economies. Some authors have been in favour of using a traditional Cobb-Douglas production
function, and ascribed the slowdown in productivity growth primarily to an excessive use of
inputs in combination with a decline in the efficiency of factor inputs use (Bergson, 1983,
Ofer, 1987). Others have favoured the use of less restrictive production functions, which
ascribe the slowdown to the lack of substitution possibilities of capital for labour over time
(Easterly and Fischer, 1994).
19 Other scholars again have emphasized the substantive degree
of technical inefficiency in centrally planned economies (Gomulka, 1986).
In Van Ark (1996) I have tried to assess the sources of growth stagnation in
Czechoslovak and East German manufacturing since 1950 by comparing the “proximate”
sources of growth in these two countries with those of two South European countries
(Portugal and Spain), and with the average for four EU countries (France, Germany, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom). The major proximate sources explaining the stagnation
in Eastern Europe were:
1) The ineffectiveness of the rapid investment in capital goods and technology, which
appeared from the paradox between slow TFP growth in combination with rapid
technological progress in the East European countries.
2) The slowdown in the accumulation of human capital in both quantitative and qualitative
terms since the 1970s.
3) The lack of openness to foreign trade and foreign direct investment outside the CMEA
region, and the lock-in into a selfcontained and regulated trading system.
Underlying these three proximate sources of stagnation was a fourth explanation of a more
“ultimate” nature, namely the political-institutional system. Essentially the central planning
system lacked the instruments to improve the quality of products and services, and it failed to
put in motion a process of transforming the structure of output, demand and trade.
20
                                           
18 In the case of the former Soviet Union some growth accounting work has been undertaken. See, for example,
Ofer (1987). For Eastern Europe, see Bergson (1987), for a regression analysis, including USSR, Hungary,
Poland and Yugoslavia, establishing the influence of capital and land intensity as well as a “socialism” dummy
on the level of output per worker in 1975.
19 This controversy directly relates to the recent debate sparked by Young and Krugman on Asian economic
growth (Young, 1995; Krugman, 1994). Krugman goes at length into drawing parallels between the failure of the
accumulation model of the former Soviet Union and the possibility of a growth slowdown in East Asia.
20 See van Ark (1996), pp. 296-303. In fact the study by Bergson (1987), referred to above, estimates that the
communist planning systems of the East European countries accounted for a decline in efficiency by some 25%
to 30%.20
4. Diversity in Industrial Performance
So far we have mainly dealt with the output and productivity performance of the total economy.
However, both during the period of central planning and since transition, major changes have
occurred in the structure of the economy. Under central planning all East European economies
underwent rapid industrialisation. Moreover the industrial sector has mostly been characterised
by above-average growth rates of labour productivity. For example, on the basis of the “adjusted
factor cost” estimates of Alton and others, Van Ark (1996) and Horlings and Van Ark (1998)
obtained manufacturing productivity growth rates for Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary
and Poland for the period 1950-1989. These growth rates were 0.3 percentage points
(Czechoslovakia and Hungary) up to 1.2 percentage points (East Germany) higher than the
productivity growth rates for the total economy. The transition since 1989 has hit the industrial
sector particularly hard, but as shown above, the productivity slowdown was limited due to the
rapid shake-out of inefficient activities once the markets for industrial products opened up.
Benchmark Comparisons of Manufacturing Productivity
To fully assess the reliability of the industrial growth estimates of the former centrally planned
economies, it is useful to complement these with estimates of relative levels of output and
productivity, which are obtained independently from the growth rates above. Such research
work, which involves industry-wise comparisons of physical quantities between countries,
weighted at employment or output values, originates from two pioneering studies on comparative
productivity in the UK and the USA by Rostas (1948) and Paige and Bombach (1950). Several
scholars have replicated this approach for different countries and benchmark years, including
several studies by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe during the mid 1960s
for Czechoslovakia and Hungary in comparison with Austria and France (Conference of
European Statisticians, 1971, 1972).
Since 1983 a substantial research effort has been underway at the University of
Groningen to develop the industry-of-origin approach as part of the International Comparisons of
Output and Productivity (ICOP) project.
21 Tables 4 and 5 report the results from six ICOP
studies, comparing manufacturing productivity levels in Czechoslovakia (1989), East Germany
(1987 and 1992), Hungary (1987) and Poland (1989 and 1993), all relative to West Germany.
22
All six studies are based on information concerning nominal output values and employment
obtained from each country’s production census or industrial survey. Industries were reclassified
to match the West German classification system. Gross output and “value added” (i.e. gross
output minus material inputs) were converted to D-Marks with “industry-specific” purchasing
                                           
21 A description of the ICOP project and a complete list of publications, reports and notes can be obtained from
the web-site of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre: http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc/homeggdc.htm
22 Except Poland (1993) which was compared to All Germany21
power parities which were based on ratios of unit values for matched products between each
country and West Germany.
23
Table 4 shows comparative levels of gross output and value added, and gross output and
value added per employee for the benchmark years on which the comparisons are based. The
estimates show that the output gap between the East European countries and West Germany was
smaller in terms of gross output than in terms of value added, which suggests a greater use of
intermediate inputs in the East European countries (see final column of Table 4).
24 There are
various explanations for the larger share of material inputs in gross output in centrally planned
economies compared to market economies. These range from a greater wastage of intermediate
inputs, often related to distorted prices, to low the technology-content and high material input-
content for many products from CPE countries (see below).
Table 4
Gross Value of Output, Value Added and Labour Productivity in Manufacturing in
East European Countries as a % of West Germany (a), 1987-1993
Gross Value Gross Value Material
Value of Added Value of Added Inputs as a
Output Output per per % of Gross
Employee Employee Output (c)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Czechoslovakia (1989) 14.7 10.6 44.7 32.3 65.1
East Germany (1987) 19.6 12.9 48.6 32.0 65.8
East Germany (1992) 5.9 4.8 56.0 46.9 61.1
Hungary (1987) 6.3 5.3 33.4 28.6 59.5
Poland (1989) 16.5 13.5 (b) 35.2 29.3 (b) 41.9
Poland (1993) (a) 9.1 7.9 27.0 23.5 59.1
West Germany 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 48.0-52.9
Note: the conversion to common currency was done at the geometric average of “industry PPPs” (unit
value ratios) at own country weights and (West)-German weights.
(a)  Poland as a % of All Germany
(b)  After adjustment of gross output UVR to a value added UVR by using a UVR for intermediate inputs
which was derived by backdating the gross output UVR by six months using the producer price
index. This adjustment was necessary because of an inflation rate of over 700% in Poland in 1989
(c)  Calculated on the basis of domestic prices
Source: Van Ark, Monnikhof and Timmer (forthcoming). Czechoslovakia/W-Germany from van Ark and
Beintema (1993) with revisions (see van Ark, 1996); East Germany/W-Germany (1987) from Beintema
and van Ark (1994) with revisions (see van Ark, 1995); East Germany/W-Germany (1992) are
unpublished ICOP/LCRA estimates (January 1996); Hungary/W-Germany (1987) from Monnikhof
(1996); Poland/W-Germany (1989) from Liberda, Monnikhof and van Ark (1996); Poland/All
Germany(1993) are unpublished ICOP/LCRA estimates (January 1996).
                                           
23 The East-European ICOP studies for manufacturing are summarised in Van Ark, Monnikhof and Timmer
(forthcoming). For references to individual country studies, which include further details, see sources of Table 3.
See Kouwenhoven (1996) for a USSR/USA comparison  of manufacturing productivity using the ICOP method.
24 The Polish case for 1989 was exceptional. Because of the high inflation during that year, prices of intermediate
inputs, which were purchased well before output was sold, were lower relative to output prices than usual.22
Table 4 shows that gross output per employee in manufacturing varied from 33
per cent of the West German level in Hungary to 49 per cent in East Germany during
the late 1980s. The value added per person employed varied from 29 per cent in
Hungary and Poland to 32 per cent in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In contrast to
the relative productivity levels for the total economy, the Hungarian productivity levels
in manufacturing are lower than in Poland. The two benchmark comparisons for the
early 1990s suggest a large improvement in manufacturing productivity in East
Germany relative to West Germany, but a worsening of the productivity performance in
Poland versus All Germany.
Table 5
Comparative Levels of Value Added per Employee in Manufacturing,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland as a % of West Germany (a), 1987-1993
Czecho- East East Hungary Poland Poland
slovakia Germany Germany
1989 1987 1992 1987 1989 1993 (a)
(1) (2) (5) (3) (4) (6)
Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 23.7 46.3 44.5 29.3 30.4 29.6
Textile Products, Wearing Apparel,
   Leather Products and Footwear 31.0 41.1 43.4 32.9 24.2 19.2
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products
   and Oil Refining 73.9 44.4 33.7 29.6 39.1 27.5
Basic and Fabricated Metal Products 35.7 40.1 63.7 30.0 21.9 19.7
Electrical and Non-electrical Machinery
   and Transport Equipment 28.0 22.4 48.1 29.8 34.4 25.9
Other Manufacturing (b) 34.2 27.7 47.5 26.3 25.6 17.8
Total Manufacturing 32.3 32.0 46.9 28.6 29.3 23.5
(a)  Poland as a % of All Germany
(b)  Includes wood products and furniture; paper and paper products and printing; non-metallic minerals and "other
manufacturing".
Source: see Table 4.
Table 5 shows the productivity results for six major branches in manufacturing. The
estimates suggest a different pattern across East European countries. In Czechoslovakia and East
Germany, the machinery and equipment branch experienced relatively low productivity levels
compared to West Germany, whereas chemicals scored relatively well. In East Germany, basic
metals and metal products showed high productivity levels compared to the other East European
countries. In Poland, chemicals and machinery and equipment showed a relatively good
productivity performance, whereas basic metals and metal products had by far the lowest
productivity level compared to West Germany. Finally, Hungary showed relatively little
variation in productivity levels by major branch around the mean for total manufacturing.
25
                                           
25 Van Ark, Monnikhof and Timmer (1999) show that in particular the machinery and equipment branches in
East European countries have a relatively large employment share in manufacturing, which is almost as high as
in advanced market economies. Hence, the relatively good manufacturing productivity performance of Poland23
Table 6
Comparative Levels of Value Added per Employee in Manufacturing,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland as a % of West Germany (a), 1950-1996,
on the basis of backward extrapolation and benchmark estimates
Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland
extra- Benchmark extra- Benchmark extra- benchmark extra- benchmark
polated polated polated polated
1954 41.8 37.9 52.0 32.1 58.7 37.5 46.2
1960 43.9 38.6 27.9 38.0
1973 31.6 29.7 22.1 32.9
1979 30.9 29.3 23.7 30.4
1987 34.2 32.0 32.0 28.6 28.6 30.2
1989 32.3 32.3 32.7 27.6 29.3 29.3
1991 28.1 59(a)/33(b) 23.9 21.7
1992 46.9 46.9 25.8 20.9
1993 30(a)/18(b) 64.2 30.8 44(a)/20(b) 23.2 23.5
1996 85.6 35.5 27.5
Note: The extrapolated figures are benchmarked on the figures printed in bold: Czechoslovakia was benchmarked on
1989; East Germany: 1954-1989 was benchmarked on 1987, and 1991-1996 was benchmarked on 1992; Hungary was
benchmarked on 1987; Poland: 1954-1989 was benchmarked on 1989, 1991-1996 was benchmarked on 1993 (relative
to All Germany). The underlined benchmark figures are historical benchmark comparisons for the year indicated. The
results in italics are based on matched plant comparisons.
(a)  average physical productivity estimates based on matched plant comparisons in engineering, food products,
clothing and textiles, furniture and miscellaneous products
(b)  average gross output value per employee deflated at actual producer producer prices and allowing for differences
in physical productivity
Sources: ICOP Industry Data Base. Contemporary benchmark estimates from Table 4. Historical benchmark estimates
from Horlings and Van Ark (1998). Time series for extrapolation from Van Ark (1996) and Horlings and Van Ark
(1998) and updated on the basis of ICOP Industry Data Base (see Appendix III). Matched plant comparisons from
Hitchens, Wagner and Birnie (1993) and Hitchens, Birnie, Hamar, Wagner and Zemplinerová (1996)
Table 6 shows the results of backward extrapolation of the contemporary benchmark
estimates from Table 4 (shown in bold in Table 6). The time series up to 1990 were obtained
on the basis of the “adjusted factor cost” estimates from the Alton group. The extrapolated
estimates of relative productivity suggest an increase in the manufacturing productivity gap
relative to West Germany for all countries. Between 1950 and 1989 the productivity gap
increased by almost 10 percentage points in Czechoslovakia, in Poland by 8 percentage
points, and in East Germany and Hungary by about 5 percentage points. In a separate study,
Horlings and Van Ark (1998) replicated the ICOP method for an earlier benchmark year,
namely 1954. These independent benchmark estimates (shown as underlined in Table 6) show
significantly higher productivity levels in manufacturing at the beginning of the period.
Hence, on the basis of these historical benchmark estimates, the productivity gap might have
declined by as much as 20-30 percentage points between 1954 and the late 1980s. Further
research on the reliability of historical benchmark estimates relative to backward
extrapolations with “adjusted factor series” is needed to assess the dynamics of productivity
change in Eastern Europe over the past half century.
                                                                                                                                        
can be traced to its high productivity levels in machinery and equipment, even though that productivity
advantage seriously declined between 1989 and 1993.24
Reconciling “Statistical Comparisons” and Matched Plant Studies
It is clear from Table 6 that since 1989 manufacturing productivity in Eastern European
countries relative to West Germany has improved. In Hungary the gap has closed by 8
percentage points, but productivity is still not much more than one third of the West German
productivity level. In Poland manufacturing productivity collapsed between 1989 and 1992
but since then there has been a clear improvement. In the East German provinces the
manufacturing productivity gap has narrowed in a spectacular way since 1992. Manufacturing
labour productivity in East Germany was 85 per cent of the West German level in 1996.
However, it should be emphasised that this productivity gain is related to the very substantial
cut in manufacturing employment since 1989. In 1998 the number of manufacturing
employees in East Germany was less than one million compared to around three million by
the end of the 1980s. The decline in manufacturing employment in the other East European
countries was much less.
Further evidence on the causes of the productivity gap which, with the exception of
East Germany, only narrow slowly, can be obtained from comparing the “statistical” results
with the results from studies which are directly based on observations at factories and plants.
Of particular interest are a range of studies by Hitchens and associates on comparisons of a
cross section of about 40 manufacturing plants in the Czech Republic, East Germany and
Hungary carried out in 1991-1993 (Hitchens, Wagner and Birnie, 1993; and Hitchens, Birnie,
Hamar, Wagner and Zemplinerová, 1996). The strength of matched plant studies is that these
are based on structured interviews with firms producing similar products in different
countries, allowing to cover the whole range of issues related to productivity, including the
quantity and quality of the capital stock in place, the performance of human capital and R&D,
the effects of organisation of shop-floor practices, production strategies and the role of
demand. As emphasized by Hitchens et al., the relatively small sample of firms in the matched
plant approach does not allow precise weighting of the relative importance of causal factors,
but the observations can be indicative of the predominant factors.
The aggregate results of the studies of Hitchens et al. are included in Table 6 (in
italics). For each country two estimates are shown. The first and highest estimate is based on
information on physical output (volumes or tonnages) per amount of labour input allocated to
the production of the products included. The second estimate is obtained after correcting gross
output value for actual price differences between countries. The price differentials between
countries for matched products are assumed by the authors to represent quality differences.
Even though the authors somewhat imprecisely call the second measure “value added”, it is
relatively close to the “value added”-productivity measure obtained from the statistical
comparisons in Table 4.
Hitchens et al. identify five performance factors which are of fundamental importance
in understanding the productivity differentials between East European countries and West
Germany:25
1)  The relatively old age of machinery and, linked to that, the inferiority of embodied
technology is an important reason for East European productivity disadvantage. Between
30 and 40 per cent of machinery in East European countries was more than 10 years old
(compared to 21 per cent in West Germany), and in between 80 and 90 per cent of the
cases the technology performance of the machinery was inferior to that of West Germany
2)  An important legacy of the period of central planning were the relatively large batch sizes
of mass standardized products. While in many cases causing high physical productivity,
these production strategies tended to involve low quality products and therefore affect the
second productivity measure in the studies by Hitchens et al..
3)  Linked to the previous point are the limited learning effects that can be obtained from
mass production strategies characterized by “low technology – high raw material content”.
4)  Despite relatively high R&D levels and high percentages of skilled people on the shop-
floor in Eastern Europe, doubts were expressed about the productivity of R&D and quality
levels of the formal qualifications compared to West Germany
5)  Lack of sophistication in consumer preferences in “shortage” economies and limited trade
opportunities with capitalist market economies prevented producers from upgrading the
quality standards of products.
To some extent these factors causing the long-run underperformance of productivity in
Eastern Europe represent inefficiencies of an allocative nature. However, these factors are
perhaps more indicative of technical inefficiencies (or “X-inefficiencies”), which have
become particularly important in central planned economies. In particular the latter type of
inefficiencies are not immediately removed with the introduction of a market system.
Conclusion
Summarising, this section and the previous one have made clear that the experiences in
productivity performance during recent years cannot be understood without looking back at
the experiences during the period of communism in Eastern Europe. Though worded
differently, the five factors inhibiting long-run productivity growth, described above, are
surprisingly similar to those described at the end of Section 3 which were based on the
“statistical” comparisons. Both sets of explanations suggest that Eastern Europe inherited a
growth paradigm which can be characterized as “extensive growth”, based on rapid
accumulation of resources without successful application of new technologies in both product
and process improvement. This system ground to a halt by the end of the 1980s. Indeed the
main challenge for Eastern Europe is to turn this growth path into one of intensive growth,
based on efficient resource use and successful adoption of new technologies. These changes
are not made in a decade’s time, but indicate the direction for productivity policies which can
be only successful in the long term (see the concluding Section of this paper).26
5. East-West Productivity Divergence and the Recent Trend Towards Convergence
So far, we have seen that the past fifty years can be characterized as having shown increasing
disparity in productivity performance in Europe. Whereas both Eastern and Western Europe
achieved rapid productivity growth during the period 1950-1973, West European growth rates
have mostly been higher than in Eastern Europe. Indeed Graph 5 shows a substantial increase in
the coefficient of variation between East and West European productivity levels, in particular
between 1960 and 1973. During the same period and within each of the two regions, low
productivity countries showed faster productivity growth than high productivity countries. This is
reflected in the decline in coefficients of variations for both regions separately. Between 1973
and 1989 both Eastern and Western Europe have experienced a productivity slowdown, and not
much further convergence has taken place in any of the two regions.  However, on the whole the
slowdown was bigger in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe so that divergence between the
two regions increased further.
The collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s created very diverse effects among
East European countries, which explained the rapid rise in divergence within Eastern Europe.
The collapse of productivity during the period 1989-1992 raised divergence between Eastern
Europe and the European Union, but since 1992 the recovery of productivity growth has led to a
convergence path between the two regions, even though diversity within the East European
region remains.
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A long-term trend towards convergence will primarily depend on the removal of the
large technical inefficiencies which have arisen during the period of central planning. This
will be a long-run process and depends primarily on the capability to create the right
conditions to combine adequate levels of human and physical capital with the adoption of
frontier technologies. In growth accounting terms, this means the capacity to create the
technical and social congruence that is needed for a process of continuous catch-up
(Abramovitz, 1991). Openness to foreign direct investment is often seen as an important
vehicle to strengthen the capacity to catch-up. In this respect the recent overtaking of the
Czech labour productivity level by Hungary may be a sign of greater effectiveness of FDI.
It is even questionable whether, from a short run perspective, rapid convergence
between East and West Europe since 1992 should be seen as a measure of potential success
for further economic integration. Both classical and neoclassical trade theories suggest that,
with integration and free mobility of resources, productivity is not likely to fully converge.
Instead countries will specialise in those industries and products where factor resources can be
put to their most productive uses. Nevertheless there is some evidence of increased intra-
industry trade between some Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovenia) and the European Union rather than specialization (Freudenberg and Lemoine,
1999). However, Freudenberg and Lemoine show that this intra-industry trade in practice
represents specialisation in vertically differentiated products. These trends are supported by
observations from new trade theories on the impact of economies of scale and locational
advantages on production structures.
However, from a long term perspective, productivity growth is the most effective way
for CEEC’s to raise per capita income and to improve living standards. Moreover, with very
large differences in productivity and efficiency use of factors between the regions, transfers of
capital and labour may take proportions which are undesirable from a social or political
perspective. Policies to attract foreign direct investment can assist in moderating the negative
effects of capital and labour mobility.
6. Conclusion
This paper has shown that the short-term changes in per capita income and productivity in
Eastern Europe should not be primarily interpreted as trends towards long-term convergence
or divergence. These are mainly temporary effects of the shocks of the late 1980s. The rapid
fall in per capita income relative to productivity is due to the rapid decline in employment-
population rates during the first three years after 1989. The productivity recovery since 1992
is mainly due to the better performance of restructured and new firms since inefficient firms
were removed during the years before. There are now signs that these temporary effects have
had their largest impact. Recently, productivity growth has shown a tendency to slow.28
The long run trend in catch-up and convergence of East European productivity relative
to the European Union depends on the success by which the past process of extensive growth,
which is based on rapid accumulation of resources without adequate technological change,
can be converted into intensive growth. The latter is based on efficient resource use and
successful adaptation of new technologies. The accumulated problems, which stem from
technical inefficiencies related to out-of-date capital, inadequately trained workers and low
R&D productivity are not removed within a decade. Indeed, 1989 should not be seen as a
watershed in terms of analysing the driving factors behind productivity growth.
In order to prevent a productivity slowdown, investment and technology policies
should focus on the long term. An economic environment needs to be created that is
conducive to productivity growth based on technological change and the upgrading of quality
of resources and products. As stated by Hitchens et al. (1993, 1996) the major future
productivity gains which are expected by managers in East European factories are better
machinery, work organisation and training required by foremen and management. In addition,
policies which reduce barriers to mobility of resources and maintain effective demand through
reducing product market restrictions, supporting foreign trade and inflow of foreign capital are
necessary complements to improve the performance of firms.
The diversity in economic performance across East European countries has been big.
This is partly due to different effects of macroeconomic and structural policies as well as
different success rates of political reforms. For example, the relatively good performance of
per capita income compared to productivity in the Czech Republic can be traced to the
moderate decline in labour force participation. Since 1989 the Czech Republic has been
characterized by fairly large transfers of high skilled labour from manufacturing to services,
but the restructuring of firms has been slower than in, for example, Hungary. In Hungary,
structural reforms started already in the 1980s, and after 1989 restructuring initially led to a
large decline in labour force participation, but recently Hungary’s productivity and per capita
income growth has been faster than in the Czech Republic.
A final conclusion to be drawn from this paper is that comparisons of productivity
between Eastern and Western Europe should be high on the research agenda. The research
should be long-term focussed, and aim to develop a variety of different productivity and
efficiency measures, including total factor productivity and measures of allocative and
technical inefficiency. This paper described the problems with TFP estimation for the period
of central planning. But even for the past decade, still very little is known about capital
intensity and TFP performance of East European economies. As argued in this paper many of
these estimates are not so useful in the immediate aftermath of the turmoil of the late 1980s,
when changes in output and factor inputs are very volatile. Moreover, the complete overhaul
of the statistical system in most East European countries has required time before estimates
became more reliable and internationally consistent. However, in the near future new work on
TFP growth and growth accounting in Eastern Europe seems desirable.29
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Appendix I – GDP, Population, Employment, GDP per capita and GDP per Person Employed, 1989-1997
The data in appendix I and II are all part of the GGDC Total Economy Data Base of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Information on this data base and exact source descriptions will be published on the internet site of the GGDC
(http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc.html) in due course. In the meantime further information can be obtained from the author.
Appendix Table I.1 – GDP in 1996 million US dollars
Bulgaria Czech East Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia East Russian European United
Republic Germany Europe* Federation Union** States
1989 61782 135329 213848 112043 245795 175392 52704 28503 811548 1711501 6371819 6345256
1990 55034 133705 187590 104572 221997 156354 51386 26194 749243 1660156 6557347 6398628
1991 48556 118357 154813 92130 206520 136148 43902 23857 669469 1578004 6657733 6334555
1992 44984 114456 164675 89309 211941 124222 41056 22546 648513 1345240 6713540 6512727
1993 44318 115102 175747 88792 219972 129357 39475 23201 660218 1232281 6665830 6670586
1994 45116 118218 189900 91411 231412 134531 41410 24431 686527 1075781 6848825 6920099
1995 46424 125258 196988 92764 247602 144217 44267 25432 725964 1031674 7014185 7118256
1996 41735 131197 202547 94050 262912 149842 47189 26323 753247 995566 7132785 7418700
1997 38814 132660 206215 98139 280992 139503 50256 27533 767897 1003530 7325457 7811189
1998 40172 128758 210628 103104 294175 129319 52467 28607 776603 957368 7531926 8114282
* countries in Table, excluding East Germany; ** present EU membership, excluding Luxembourg
Sources and Methods: 1996 GDP levels in US$: for OECD countries, including Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, on the basis of GDP in market prices and
EKS purchasing power parities obtained from OECD National Accounts, Volume I, 1960-1996 supplemented with printout on purchasing power parities from
OECD internet site (http://www.oecd.org). East Germany on the basis of share of East German “länder” in All Germany GDP at national currencies from
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftforschung (DIW), Vierteljährliche Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung (http://statfinder.diw-berlin.de). Bulgaria, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia and the Russian Federation from P. Havlik et al. (1999), “The Transition Countries in 1999”, WIIW Research Report no. 257. Movement of
GDP in constant prices: 1994-1998 for OECD countries, including Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, from OECD internet site (http://www.oecd.org) linked
to 1996. 1990-1994 extrapolated from 1994 with GDP trend from OECD National Accounts, op cit..  1989-1997 for East Germany from movement of GDP for
All Germany minus GDP for West Germany from DIW op cit.. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Russian Federation for 1990-1994 from Economic
Commission for Europe, “Economic Survey of Europe, 1998” and for 1994-1998 from Havlik (1999), op. cit. 1989-1990 (except East Germany) from A.
Maddison (1995), Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, OECD Development Centre.33
Appendix Table I.2 – Population (in millions)
Bulgaria Czech East Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia East Russian European United
Republic Germany Europe* Federation Union** States
1989 8989 10314 16399 10576 37963 23152 5245 1962 98201 147419 346484 248781
1990 8966 10310 16111 10553 38119 23200 5263 1969 98379 148088 348299 249911
1991 8914 10309 15910 10344 38245 22974 5283 1966 98035 148465 349942 252643
1992 8869 10319 15730 10313 38365 22748 5307 1959 97880 148592 351843 255407
1993 8495 10329 15635 10296 38462 22716 5329 1960 97588 148483 353709 258120
1994 8448 10333 15544 10278 38543 22683 5352 1965 97602 148306 355028 260651
1995 8399 10327 14831 10255 38596 22638 5368 1970 97553 148124 356841 263057
1996 8345 10313 14135 10229 38617 22580 5379 1974 97437 147746 358692 265557
1997 8291 10298 14020 10203 38621 22519 5388 1973 97293 147306 359437 268006
1998 8240 10286 14021 10179 38613 22451 5393 1972 97135 146861 359985 270418
* countries in Table, excluding East Germany; ** present EU membership, excluding Luxembourg
Sources and Methods: Midyear population up to 1992 from Maddison (1995). From 1992 updated with population estimates US Dept. of Commerce,
International Data Base (http://www.census.gov/ipc). East Germany derived from All Germany minus West Germany.34
Appendix Table I.3 – Total Employment (in millions)
Bulgaria Czech East Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia East Russian European United
Republic Germany Europe* Federation Union** States
1989 4481 5245 9747 4899 17586 10848 2498 939 46496 75168 146000 119029
1990 4205 4995 8820 4808 16840 10865 2478 902 45093 75325 149133 120430
1991 3658 4817 7321 4506 15853 10785 2281 832 42733 73848 148750 119282
1992 3360 4883 6387 4083 15181 10595 2013 777 40893 72071 148135 120058
1993 3307 4911 6219 3827 14894 10234 2012 760 39946 70852 145159 121744
1994 3242 4977 6330 3752 14802 10011 1977 746 39507 68484 144696 124478
1995 3283 4962 6396 3679 14929 9493 2020 745 39111 66441 145729 126242
1996 3286 4976 6267 3648 15099 9379 2036 742 39166 65950 146478 127995
1997 3157 4946 6078 3659 15295 9023 2041 743 38865 64639 147574 130811
1998 3106 4872 6055 3714 15479 8572 2032 745 38520 64300 148878 132773
* countries in Table, excluding East Germany; ** present EU membership, excluding Luxembourg
Sources and Methods: 1989-1996 for OECD countries, including Czech Republic, Hungary (from 1992 onwards) and Poland (from 1992 onwards) from OECD
Labour Force Statistics 1976-1996. 1996-1998 movement from OECD Economic Outlook (June 1999). East Germany from Deutsches Institut für
Wirtschaftforschung (DIW), Vierteljährliche Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung (http://statfinder.diw-berlin.de). 1989-1994 movement for Bulgaria, Hungary
(1989-1992), Poland (1989-1992), Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Russian Federation from P. Havlik et al., “Exchange Rates, Competitiveness and Labour
Cost in Central and Eastern Europe”, WIIW Research Report no. 231, and 1994-1998 from P. Havlik et al. (1999), “The Transition Countries in 1999”, WIIW
Research Report no. 257. Romania 1997-1998 change in employment assumed at -5%.35
Appendix Table I.4 – GDP per capita in 1996 US dollars
Bulgaria Czech East Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia East Russian European United
Republic Germany Europe* Federation Union** States
1989 6873 13120 13040 10594 6475 7576 10049 14525 8264 11610 18390 25505
1990 6138 12969 11644 9909 5824 6739 9764 13302 7616 11211 18827 25604
1991 5447 11481 9731 8907 5400 5926 8310 12135 6829 10629 19025 25073
1992 5072 11092 10469 8660 5524 5461 7737 11506 6626 9053 19081 25499
1993 5217 11143 11241 8624 5719 5695 7407 11836 6765 8299 18846 25843
1994 5341 11441 12217 8894 6004 5931 7737 12432 7034 7254 19291 26549
1995 5527 12130 13282 9045 6415 6371 8246 12907 7442 6965 19656 27060
1996 5001 12722 14330 9194 6808 6636 8772 13338 7731 6738 19886 27936
1997 4681 12882 14708 9619 7276 6195 9328 13954 7893 6813 20380 29146
1998 4875 12517 15022 10129 7619 5760 9729 14509 7995 6519 20923 30006
* countries in Table, excluding East Germany; ** present EU membership, excluding Luxembourg
Sources: see Appendix Tables I.1 and I.2
Appendix Table I.5 – GDP per person employed in 1996 US dollars
Bulgaria Czech East Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia East Russian European United
Republic Germany Europe* Federation Union** States
1989 13789 25802 21940 22870 13977 16168 21099 30366 17454 22769 43643 53308
1990 13087 26768 21269 21752 13183 14391 20737 29029 16616 22040 43970 53132
1991 13272 24571 21146 20446 13027 12624 19247 28667 15666 21368 44758 53106
1992 13386 23440 25783 21873 13961 11725 20392 29014 15859 18665 45320 54247
1993 13400 23438 28260 23202 14769 12640 19617 30520 16528 17392 45921 54792
1994 13918 23753 30000 24363 15634 13438 20947 32740 17377 15709 47333 55593
1995 14142 25243 30799 25214 16585 15192 21916 34128 18562 15528 48132 56386
1996 12701 26366 32320 25781 17413 15976 23173 35490 19232 15096 48695 57961
1997 12293 26821 33928 26822 18371 15461 24624 37037 19758 15525 49639 59714
1998 12933 26428 34786 27762 19005 15086 25819 38389 20161 14889 50591 61114
* countries in Table, excluding East Germany; ** present EU membership, excluding Luxembourg
Sources: see Appendix Tables I.1 and I.336
Appendix II –GDP per Person Employed, 1950-1989
Appendix Table II.1 – GDP per person employed in 1996 US dollars
Bulgaria Czecho- East Hungary Poland Romania Eastern European
slovakia Germany Europe* Union **
1950 3179 9539 8316 8488 5624 3760 6197 12288
1951 3822 9556 9096 5802
1952 3636 9742 9246 5864
1953 4032 9609 9296 6130
1954 3945 9898 9537 6400
1955 4215 10641 10569 10256 6631 5296 7672
1956 4207 10979 9643 6844
1957 4639 11479 10469 7119
1958 5028 12259 11063 7376
1959 5412 12731 11354 7500
1960 5907 13619 13538 11907 7809 6529 9498 19129
1961 6274 14261 13627 12642 8332 6961 9940
1962 6770 14480 14020 13144 8120 7196 10106
1963 7058 13996 14538 13760 8504 7703 10435
1964 7592 14446 14916 14384 8778 8180 10853
1965 8024 14854 15479 14481 9152 8677 11262
1966 8632 15380 15939 15192 9613 9655 11876
1967 9069 15711 16388 15855 9842 10083 12264
1968 9209 16353 17139 15990 10313 10282 12676
1969 9630 16562 17464 16408 10087 10741 12855
1970 10148 16803 17860 16291 10484 10968 13150
1971 10441 17284 18200 16976 11011 12500 13829
1972 10894 17799 18775 17298 11513 13287 14360
1973 11283 18293 19282 18150 12101 13694 14879 34138
1974 11596 18853 20055 18574 12560 14445 15431
1975 12502 19304 20680 18925 12932 15074 15936
1976 12885 19441 20910 18934 13215 15865 16282
1977 12770 20142 21445 20072 13288 16246 16652
1978 13054 20208 21647 20507 13715 16794 17014
1979 13569 20199 22071 20496 13354 17301 17099 39648
1980 13188 20634 22424 20655 12979 17369 17087
1981 13444 20395 22687 20909 12377 17207 16926
1982 13785 20713 22419 21774 12354 17169 17040
1983 13430 20938 22636 21662 13060 16963 17274
1984 13875 21236 23136 22316 13505 17563 17760
1985 13443 21199 23740 21810 13538 17389 17741
1986 13758 21313 24061 22225 13926 17541 18031
1987 13744 21285 24398 22724 13780 17102 17997 44620
1988 13711 21619 24598 23254 14183 16921 18229 45950
1989 13789 21715 21940 22870 13977 16168 17673 47096
* countries in Table; ** present EU membership, excluding Luxembourg
Source: GDP from Maddison (1995) but converted from 1990 GK dollars into 1996 EKS dollars as described in
Appendix Table I.1. Employment: OECD countries 1970-1989 from OECD Labour Force Statistics (various
issues); 1950, 1960 and 1973 from Maddison (1991, 1995) linked to 1973 estimates from OECD; East European
countries from Table I.3, extrapolated backwards with trends from UN/ECE (1998), P. Marer and associates
(1992), Historically Planned Economies. A Guide to the Data, World Bank, and Maddison (1995), op. cit37
Appendix III –Output, Employment and Labour Productivity in Manufacturing, 1950-1997
The data in appendix III are all part of the ICOP Industry Data Base. Information on this data base and exact source descriptions can be obtained from the author.
Appendix Table III.1 – Output per person employed, 1975=100
Poland Hungary Czechoslovakia East Germany West Germany
Output Employ- Produc- Output Employ- Produc- Output Employ- Produc- Output Employ- Produc- Output Employ- Produc-
ment tivity ment tivity ment tivity ment tivity ment tivity
1950 13.2 41.4 31.9 25.0 45.7 54.6 28.3 57.1 49.5 23.6 72.9 32.3 19.3 73.2 26.3
1951 15.4 44.9 34.4 28.2 53.2 52.9 29.7 61.4 48.5 28.2 79.0 35.7 22.1 77.6 28.5
1952 16.7 47.7 35.0 32.2 60.7 53.0 30.2 64.0 47.2 30.3 82.8 36.6 25.2 79.4 31.7
1953 19.0 51.1 37.2 33.5 65.5 51.1 30.3 65.4 46.3 34.1 85.3 39.9 28.1 82.3 34.2
1954 20.8 53.4 38.9 34.8 66.9 52.0 31.2 66.9 46.6 38.3 86.2 44.4 31.5 85.7 36.8
1955 23.0 55.8 41.2 37.5 65.5 57.3 35.4 68.3 51.9 41.3 86.2 47.9 36.9 91.9 40.1
1956 24.8 58.1 42.6 34.3 66.9 51.3 38.6 70.0 55.2 43.5 86.4 50.4 39.9 95.8 41.6
1957 27.1 60.3 45.0 38.9 65.5 59.4 42.5 72.8 58.3 44.7 89.5 50.0 42.6 98.7 43.2
1958 29.4 61.0 48.3 42.4 68.3 62.1 47.4 74.6 63.5 48.1 91.4 52.7 45.0 98.8 45.5
1959 31.8 61.7 51.6 45.9 72.4 63.4 51.7 77.0 67.1 54.0 89.3 60.5 49.1 99.5 49.3
1960 35.1 62.1 56.5 50.0 77.1 64.8 56.5 80.7 70.1 58.6 90.5 64.8 55.7 105.8 52.6
1961 37.9 63.7 59.4 54.7 80.5 67.9 60.0 83.8 71.6 60.5 91.0 66.5 59.0 108.9 54.2
1962 40.7 66.3 61.4 58.9 82.3 71.6 62.7 86.2 72.8 63.6 90.6 70.2 61.9 109.4 56.6
1963 43.0 67.9 63.2 61.7 85.0 72.5 61.6 86.6 71.2 66.2 90.0 73.6 63.1 108.6 58.1
1964 46.7 69.2 67.4 66.6 87.3 76.4 63.4 87.0 72.8 68.0 88.2 77.1 68.7 108.7 63.2
1965 50.5 72.7 69.5 70.9 88.8 79.9 67.4 90.2 74.7 70.5 88.4 79.8 74.0 110.6 66.9
1966 53.5 75.3 71.1 77.0 90.1 85.5 69.2 91.6 75.5 72.5 88.7 81.7 75.3 109.4 68.8
1967 57.3 78.4 73.0 80.4 91.6 87.8 72.8 93.0 78.3 74.6 89.3 83.5 73.7 103.5 71.1
1968 61.3 81.2 75.4 83.4 94.1 88.6 76.4 94.4 80.9 78.3 91.6 85.4 81.3 104.3 78.0
1969 65.3 84.2 77.5 84.3 97.5 86.4 78.4 95.9 81.8 81.7 92.1 88.7 90.8 108.6 83.6
1970 69.4 85.6 81.1 87.9 99.8 88.0 82.7 97.3 85.0 84.7 92.1 92.0 95.5 111.2 85.9
1971 73.9 88.7 83.4 89.2 98.2 90.9 84.9 97.8 86.8 86.9 92.1 94.4 96.5 110.5 87.3
1972 79.9 92.4 86.4 90.4 97.7 92.5 88.6 98.3 90.2 88.6 97.8 90.5 99.6 108.4 91.9
1973 86.1 95.5 90.2 94.1 99.2 94.8 92.1 98.9 93.1 91.0 99.0 91.9 106.0 109.1 97.138
1974 92.1 98.1 93.9 96.4 100.4 96.1 95.5 99.4 96.1 95.4 99.4 96.1 105.0 106.5 98.5
1975 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1976 101.0 100.5 100.4 103.0 93.1 110.6 104.4 100.3 104.1 104.2 100.9 103.2 107.7 97.7 110.1
1977 102.2 101.7 100.6 108.0 93.0 116.1 108.1 101.0 107.0 106.4 101.5 104.9 109.6 98.1 111.8
1978 103.7 101.2 102.5 111.5 93.1 119.7 111.0 101.4 109.5 109.6 101.9 107.6 111.7 97.9 114.1
1979 101.9 100.3 101.6 113.5 91.6 123.9 113.1 102.0 110.9 113.3 102.4 110.6 117.3 99.1 118.4
1980 100.4 102.1 98.4 112.2 89.1 125.9 115.8 102.3 113.3 116.8 102.4 114.1 115.3 100.0 115.3
1981 87.2 101.3 86.1 113.9 86.9 131.1 118.4 102.5 115.6 120.5 103.0 117.0 113.7 98.2 115.9
1982 82.6 94.6 87.4 115.3 84.8 136.0 120.0 102.6 117.0 120.5 103.5 116.4 109.7 95.3 115.1
1983 88.6 93.3 94.9 116.3 81.5 142.7 122.7 102.7 119.5 121.9 104.1 117.0 110.8 92.1 120.3
1984 91.8 92.8 99.0 120.0 81.0 148.1 124.6 103.0 120.9 126.1 105.0 120.0 113.9 91.7 124.2
1985 93.5 93.4 100.0 120.1 82.1 146.2 127.3 103.3 123.2 128.1 105.7 121.1 117.5 92.8 126.6
1986 94.4 88.9 106.2 122.5 81.6 150.2 128.3 103.6 123.9 128.6 105.3 122.1 119.2 94.3 126.4
1987 92.5 88.3 104.8 123.8 79.9 155.0 128.6 101.2 127.1 131.2 104.8 125.2 115.9 94.4 122.8
1988 93.4 86.7 107.7 121.9 77.7 157.0 130.8 103.1 126.8 134.5 104.8 128.4 119.6 94.2 126.9
1989 89.4 83.5 107.1 115.6 75.2 153.6 129.8 102.5 126.6 139.7 103.6 134.8 123.7 95.5 129.4
1990 67.9 75.9 89.4 105.0 67.3 156.1 126.9 99.4 127.6 94.8 89.4 106.0 130.5 98.2 132.9
1991 59.8 71.7 83.4 85.8 59.9 143.3 51.3 87.7 58.5 135.3 99.6 135.9
1992 62.2 64.2 96.8 77.5 50.6 153.1 53.9 55.8 96.5 131.6 97.9 134.5
1993 66.1 62.9 105.1 80.6 45.0 179.0 61.4 47.5 129.2 121.1 92.0 131.6
1994 74.2 61.5 120.5 88.2 42.6 207.0 72.4 44.9 161.3 123.8 87.4 141.7
1995 81.3 61.9 131.4 92.3 40.8 226.2 79.3 44.3 179.0 123.8 85.5 144.9
1996 88.0 62.1 141.8 95.4 40.9 233.6 84.0 42.9 195.6 123.6 82.8 149.3
Methods and Sources: East European countries up to 1990 (except East Germany: up to 1984): based on Adjusted Factor Cost method derived from various reports of Alton and
Associates, Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe. For full references for Czechoslovakia and East Germany, see B. van Ark (1996), "Convergence and
Divergence in the European Periphery: Productivity in Eastern and Southern Europe in Retrospect", in B. van Ark and N.F.R. Crafts, eds., Quantitative Aspects of Post-War
European Economic Growth, CEPR/Cambridge University Press, pp. 271-326. For full references for Hungary and Poland, see E. Horlings and B. van Ark  (1998), "Benchmark
Comparisons of Manufacturing Productivity in Eastern Europe, 1937-1989", in Bart van Ark, Erik Buyst and Jan Luiten van Zanden, eds., Historical Benchmark Comparisons of
Output and Productivity, Proceedings of 12
th International Economic History Congress, Madrid. East Germany 1984-1990 from B. Görzig (1991), "Produktion und
Produktionsfaktoren in Ostdeutschland", Dokumentation, DIW, Berlin. Hungary and Poland since 1990: time series on industrial output from UN/ECE (1998) and labour input
series from OECD Labour Force Statistics. West Germany and (since 1990) East Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, various issues,
supplemented with estimates from DIW on East Germany (1989-1991).39
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